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ARGUMENT 
I. UTA'S RESPONSE TO THE CLAIMANT'S POINT I. 
A. The Claimant's Criticism of the Board's Finding of Knowledge Is at 
Odds with the Record and His Own Argument that the Board's 
Findings of Fact are Supported by the Record. 
The Claimant's suggestion that the knowledge element of the just cause test has 
not been met is incongruent with the Board's findings, the record before this Court, and 
the Claimant's own acknowledgment that the Board's findings of fact are supported by 
the record. (Brief of Respondent David S. Holly ("CI. Br.") at 4-5.) In the opening 
paragraph of his Point I, the Claimant argues that "[t]he Judge's (and Board's) Findings 
of Fact are Supported by the Record as a Whole". (CI. Br. at 4.) Oddly, in the very next 
paragraph, he in essence contends that the knowledge element is not supported by the 
record.1 (CI. Br. at 5.) In particular, the Claimant asserts that he was not "on notice as to 
the seriousness of his alleged comments" because he allegedly did not receive a copy of a 
civil rights policy and because he denied the May, 2001, incident. Id. Because the Board 
already found that the Claimant had knowledge of the seriousness of using the "N" word 
and other racially derogatory remarks in the workplace, the Claimant's present assertion 
1
 The Claimant's discussion regarding the administrative law judge's ("ALJ's") 
decisionmaking on credibility of witnesses also cuts against 1he Claimant. (CI. Br. at 7.) 
In that discussion, the Claimant states that "[t]he Judge was in the best position to see and 
hear all the witnesses testify". Next, the Claimant reminds the Court that the Claimant 
"categorically denied making any and all pejorative remarks". Id. Notably, the ALJ did 
not believe the Claimant's denials with regard to the May, 2001, and November, 2001, 
incidents. Instead, the ALJ found that the Claimant made racially derogatory remarks 
during those incidents despite the Claimant's "categorical[]" denials. 
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is wholly inconsistent with the Board's findings and his own opening statement that the 
Board's findings are supported by the record. 
The Claimant's selective disturbance of the Board's factual finding on the 
knowledge element is also inconsistent with the record. As is more fully explained in 
UTA's Reply to the Board, the Claimant indisputably knew that the use of the "N" word 
and other racially insensitive comments in the workplace, is improper. (Reply Brief of 
Petitioner Utah Transit Authority Responding to Brief of Respondent Workforce Appeals 
Board ("UTA Reply to Bd.") at 16-17.) Not only did the Claimant admit that the use of 
such language was wrong, but the weight of evidence reveals that the Claimant knew of, 
and received orientation on, policies against such language. Furthermore, the use of 
racially derogatory terms in the workplace defies universal standards of conduct. (UTA 
Reply to Bd. at 17.) Because the knowledge element is so plainly anchored in the record 
and the Board's findings, the Claimant's present attempt to shift responsibility for his 
misconduct to another person or entity by denying knowledge of the impropriety of such 
misconduct, is groundless. 
B. The Claimant Implicitly Acknowledges that the Parts Counter 
Conversation Could Have Been Overheard. 
The Claimant admits to the "possibility] that another UTA employee could have 
approached the parts counter" during the November, 2001, conversation between the 
Claimant and Dennis Husted (the "Parts Counter Conversation"). UTA has appealed the 
Board's factual finding that the November, 2001, conversation was "private" based in 
part on the location and openness of the parts counter. (Brief of Petitioner Utah Transit 
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Authority ("UTA Op. Br.") at 11-13.) A conversation between co-workers at a 
maintenance shop parts counter is not "private". As now acknowledged by the Claimant, 
"[i]t is possible" that other employees could have approached the counter during the Parts 
Counter Conversation. It logically follows that other employees could have overheard 
that Conversation. The general openness of workplace conversations like the Parts 
Counter Conversation belies the Board's depiction of the November, 2001, conversation 
as "private". Even so, the use of racial epithets in a workplace conversation contributes 
to a hostile work environment even if the conversation does not directly involve a person 
of the offended racial group. (UTA Op. Br. at 26-30.) 
C. The Claimant's Focus on What Mr. Dickerson Heard Does Not Detract 
from the Claimant's Culpability for What the Claimant Said. 
UTA did not argue in its opening brief that Derando Dickerson heard the Claimant 
use a racial epithet in the Parts Counter Conversation. Rather, UTA maintains that 
regardless of whether Mr. Dickerson overheard the epithet, the Claimant is culpable 
under the Department of Workforce Services' ("Department's") just cause test. 
Nonetheless, in its Point I the Claimant focuses on whether Mr. Dickerson overheard the 
Claimant's use of racially derogatory remarks. (CI. Br. at 6.) The Claimant's attention to 
what Mr. Dickerson heard cannot distract from what the Claimant said. As argued in 
UTA's opening brief and its Reply to the Board, the Claimant's use of the "N" word in 
November, 2001, contributed to a hostile work environment even if Mr. Dickerson did 
not hear the slur first-hand. (UTA Op. Br. at 26-30.) Courts have established that the use 
of racial slurs, even out of the presence of a racial minority, fosters a hostile work 
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environment. E.g., Aguilar v. Avis Rent A Car System, Inc., 980 P.2d 846, 862 (Cal. 
1999). Accordingly, the Claimant's assertions that there is "virtually no credible 
evidence" that Mr. Dickerson overheard the May, 2001, November, 2001, or January, 
2002, comments, are inconsequential to the Claimant's culpability. The Claimant used 
racially offensive remarks that contribute to a hostile work environment. As a result, 
UTA's rightful interest in avoiding the risk of a Title VII claim would have been 
jeopardized if it had retained the Claimant. 
II. UTA'S RESPONSE TO THE CLAIMANT'S POINT II. 
A. Nearly All of the Claimant's Point II Is Premised on the Flawed 
Assumption that Culpability Hinges on Actual or Imminent Liability. 
The lion's share of the Claimant's Point II is a reiteration of the Board's 
proposition that the Claimant's culpability is contingent upon an actual, or "high 
potential" for, a Title VII claim. In its brief, the Board started from the mistaken 
assumption that because there must be more than one racial slur to sustain a Title VII 
action under the Tenth Circuit analysis, a person who uses one racial slur in the 
workplace is not culpable under Rule 994-405-202 of the Department's Workforce 
Information and Payment Services Rules (hereinafter, the "Rule") . Likewise, the 
Claimant opens its Point II by making that same assumption. In particular, the Claimant 
asserts that "[t]here is no evidence that any litigation was ever threatened or that any 
litigation ever developed". (CI. Br. at 9, 16 (Claimant stating that "[i]n the instant case, 
there was no harm - present or future").) The Claimant apparently assumes that, absent 
an actual filing of a Title VII action against UTA, or a "high potential for legal 
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exposure", the Claimant is not culpable under the Rule. (CI. Br. at 12.) In the balance of 
Point II, the Claimant indirectly states that same assumption in two other ways. 
First, the Claimant contends that because UTA would not be found liable for the 
Claimant's actions, the Claimant should not be found culpable under the Rule. (CI. Br. at 
9.) The Claimant goes so far as to enumerate various elements of a Title VII action, and 
speculates on the likelihood of Derando Dickerson prevailing on an Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") charge or lawsuit against UTA. (CI. Br. at 9-10.) 
By asking this Court to walk through the elements of a Title VII claim, and speculating 
on whether a Title VII claim is imminent or proven, the Claimant falls back on on the 
assumption that the Claimant's culpability turns on the existence or "high potential" for a 
Title VII claim. 
Second, the Claimant restates that assumption when he argues that UTA had to 
prove that it had "no alternative than to immediately fire" the Claimant. (CI. Br. at 13.) 
The Claimant suggests that UTA could have avoided Title VII liability by taking "prompt 
and remedial action" apart from discharging the Claimant. (CI. Br. at 14-15 ("If UTA 
had taken corrective action against Mr. Holly short of a discharge and if Mr. Dickerson 
had filed an EEO complaint or civil action, UTA would, of course, have been able to 
argue that it responded to any complaints which Mr. Dickerson may have made in an 
2
 The Claimant's related remark that UTA skipped progressive discipline steps echoes a 
comment of the Board, and is responded to in full in UTA's Reply to the Board. (UTA 
Reply to Bd. at 15.) In brief, UTA's zero-tolerance policies against harassment and racial 
slurs expressly allow for termination for a violation of one of those policies. Therefore, 
UTA was not required to follow any "progressive discipline" steps when the Claimant 
violated those policies. 
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immediate and decisive manner").) Based on that suggestion, the Claimant would 
apparently have UTA and other employers wait for a hostile work environment to arise, 
respond quickly by taking some action against the harassing employee, and trust that a 
jury will concur that it took "prompt and remedial action" after it had actual or 
constructive knowledge of the offensive conduct. By taking that approach, the Claimant 
sets the bar for culpability at an unrealistic and unintended level. Here again, the 
Claimant assumes that an employer must wait for a cognizable claim to materialize or 
hover before it may discharge an employee to protect its rightful interest in avoiding the 
claim. 
Each of the Claimant's above-stated assertions springs from the same flawed 
assumption that the culpability element requires a lawsuit to be imminent or filed to 
establish that an employer's rightful interest in avoiding litigation is jeopardized. As 
UTA has more fully briefed in its opening brief and in its Reply Brief to the Board, that 
assumption requires a misapplication of the Rule and a misinterpretation of Title VII. In 
the spirit of efficiency, UTA will not repeat in full the manner of that misapplication and 
misinterpretation here, but incorporates its earlier arguments. (E.g., UTA Op. Br. at 
13-22; UTA Reply to Bd. at 3-9.) By way of summary, the plain language of the Rule, 
and Utah courts in interpreting the Department's rules, contemplate that an employer 
must show that it bears a risk of future harm if it continues the employment relationship. 
For instance, by requiring an employer to show that its rightful interest would be 
"jeopardize^]", as opposed to "harmed", the Department plainly requires only a showing 
of a risk of litigation, rather than actual or imminent litigation. (UTA Reply to Bd. at 
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3-5.) Thus, contrary to the Claimant's proposal that employers wait for a hostile work 
environment to develop before responding with some "prompt and remedial action", the 
Rule intends that UTA may end the Claimant's employment based on a risk of a hostile 
work environment materializing if the Claimant is retained.3 
Furthermore, the use of the "N" word in the workplace jeopardizes an employer's 
rightful interest in avoiding Title VII litigation because even one use of the "N" word in 
the workplace indisputably contributes to a hostile work environment. Although the 
Tenth Circuit may require more than one use of the "N" word to substantiate a hostile 
work environment claim, no one can predict with any certainty the precise number of 
racial epithets that will generate a hostile work environment. Undoubtedly, that number 
will vary according to the facts and circumstances of each case. As a result, the only sure 
1
 The Claimant's assumption that Title VII liability must be realized or imminent 
is further contradicted by the Rule. The first sentence of the culpability test requires that 
the employer show that "continuing the employment relationship would jeopardize the 
employer's rightful interest". Utah Code Adm. P. R994-405-202(l) (emphasis added). 
By linking the risk to the employer's rightful interest to the phrase "continuing the 
employment relationship", the Department patently recognized that culpability is 
established when retaining the employee threatens future liability of the employer based 
on a subsequent action of, or circumstances involving, the employee. Accord Kehl v. Bd. 
of Review, 700 P.2d 1129, 1134 (Utah 1985) (holding that "single violation of a safety 
rule may be sufficient to show that the potential hann to the employer's interests 
warranted discharge"). Consequently, the Claimant misstates the law when he suggests 
that this Court take a snapshot of the facts as they are now and measure the level of 
exposure of UTA to a Title VII claim. Instead, this Court should examine the Claimant's 
current misconduct and the risk of future misconduct if UTA "continues] the 
employment relationship". As previously argued, UTA would carry a risk that a hostile 
work environment would develop if the Claimant had been retained. (UTA Reply to Bd. 
at 7-9.) By discharging the Claimant, UTA took the only reliable step to ensure that it 
would not have to endure the liability, defense costs, and federal scrutiny of a Title VII 
claim. 
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method available to UTA and other employers to protect against the evolution of a hostile 
work environment is to sever an employment relationship with an employee who uses a 
single racial slur in the workplace. Absent that severance, UTA sends a message that 
such slurs are tolerated, and the racially intolerant conduct may continue in the same 
employee or through other employees.4 See, e.g., Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 882 
(9th Cir. 1991) (EEOC may pursue a Title VII claim against an employer that fails to 
remedy harassment in a manner that "takes into account the remedy's ability to persuade 
potential harassers to refrain from unlawful conduct"). Contrary to the Claimant's belief, 
there is a clear potential for Title VII liability when an employer retains an employee who 
uses a racial epithet in the workplace. Hence, UTA's zero-tolerance approach to racial 
slurs is not a reaction to overblown fears as suggested by the Claimant, but a well thought 
out means of protecting UTA's interest in averting hostile work environment claims. 
In short, the Claimant's and the Board's assumption that UTA must be subject to a 
"high potential" for a Title VII claim, or an actual claim, does not comport with the Rule 
nor court holdings. Nearly all of pages 8 through 16 of the Claimant's Brief rely upon 
that unsound assumption and are, therefore, unpersuasive. 
4
 The Claimant's contention that UTA had "many, many options" overlooks the threat of 
a hostile work environment that ensues if employer's fail to take a zero-tolerance 
approach to the use of racial slurs in the workplace. (CI. Br. at 14.) That contention also 
disregards the Claimant's previous use of racially derogatory remarks in May, 2001. 
When the Claimant engaged in racially insensitive conduct again in November, 2001, he 
revealed a stubbornness or disregard for the impropriety of such conduct in the 
workplace. To adequately protect its rightful interest in avoiding Title VII litigation, 
UTA exercised the only sure option of discharging the Claimant. 
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B. The Claimant's Use of Racially Intolerant Remarks in May, 2001, 
Quashes His Suggestion that His Use of the "N" Word in November, 
2001, Was an "Isolated Incident". 
The remaining two paragraphs of the Claimant's Point II erroneously suggest that 
the Claimant's use of the "N" word during the Parts Counter Conversation amounted to 
an "isolated incident of poor judgment". (CI. Br. at 16, |^ 2.) Because this suggestion 
was previously raised by the Board in its brief, UTA incorporates, without reiterating 
here in total, its response as set forth in its Reply Brief to the Board. (UTA Reply to 
Board at 12-14.) Like the Board, the Claimant ignores his use of racially derogatory 
remarks in May, 2001, and fails to offer any explanation for the similarity between that 
incident and the Claimant's use of the "N" word in the Parts Counter Conversation. In 
both situations, the Claimant made racially offensive remarks. Clearly then, the 
Claimant's use of the "N" word was not "isolated" at all, but an evenn more severe 
recurrence. 
III. UTA'S RESPONSE TO THE CLAIMANT'S CONCLUSION. 
A. UTA's Policies Against Racial Slurs Are Aimed at Ridding the 
Workplace of Conduct that Subjects Employers to Title VII Claims. 
The Claimant wishes this Court to determine that UTA merely sought to further its 
own interest in enforcing a "civility code" when it discharged the Claimant. The 
Claimant seemingly proposes that UTA's policies against harassment and racial slurs 
(hereinafter collectively referred to as the "Policies") are simply "civility codes". In 
doing so, the Claimant downplays the severity of racial epithets, likening them to just 
name-calling. (CI. Br. at 17, f^ 3.) However, it is well-settled that the use of a racial slur 
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such as the "N" word is among the most egregious of terms, and contributes to a hostile 
work environment. Thus, UTA's Policies are not designed to instill simple courtesies. 
While civility is attained through those Policies, they are plainly intended to rid the 
workplace of racial slurs and harassment that may underlie an actionable Title VII claim. 
(See, e.g., R. 24 (Exh. 17) (UTA's Harassment policy stating that "[i]t is the policy of 
UTA that . . . such conduct is against the law and will not be tolerated from any UTA 
employee".) In short, by steadfastly enforcing Policies against racial slurs and 
harassment, UTA avoids the risk of Title VII liability that it would otherwise shoulder by 
continuing an employment relationship with a violator of one of those Policies. 
B. The Claimant Should Bear the "Social Cost" of His Own Misconduct. 
The Claimant infers that UTA should absorb the "social cost" of enforcing its 
Policies against the Claimant. That inference fails for two main reasons. First, the Rule 
provides a framework for determining whether that cost will fall on the employer. In this 
case, the Claimant's conduct was so serious that continuing his employment would have 
jeopardized UTA's rightful interest in avoiding a Title VII claim. 
Second, shifting the "social cost" of the Claimant's unemployment to UTA 
undermines broader social aims. For instance, Congress and federal courts have already 
determined that racial slurs are inappropriate in the workplace, and that employers who 
allow slurs to be used in the workplace are at risk of a hostile work environment claim. 
By requiring UTA to pay the Claimant any measure of unemployment benefits, this Court 
would essentially penalize UTA for taking seriously the objectives of Title VII. See, e.g., 
Ellison, 924 F.2d at 876 (" . . . Title VII's protection of employees from sex 
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discrimination comes into play long before the point where victims of sexual harassment 
require psychiatric assistance"). Additionally, shifting the "social cost" away from the 
Claimant contradicts the Department's own goals. The Department has by rule 
determined that a victim of harassment in the workplace will receive benefits. Utah Code 
Adm. P. R994-405-102(10), (11). Surely, the Department did not intend to saddle an 
employer with the "social cost" of unemployment compensation benefits for both the 
victim of harassment and the harassing employee who is lerminated for the harassing 
conduct. 
At the end of the day, the Claimant used an abhorrent racial epithet in the 
workplace contrary to established workplace norms and an express UTA policy. A 
"social cost" has already been born by the persons who were exposed to that conduct or 
learned of it afterwards. The Claimant should bear the balance of the cost of his own 
misconduct. 
C. The Department Has Found Culpable a Claimant Who Violated UTA's 
Policies Against Racial Slurs by Using the "N" Word in the Workplace. 
Neither the Claimant nor the Board has distinguished the Clipper matter from the 
present facts. As mentioned in UTA's opening brief, since issuing the Holly decision, the 
Department has denied benefits to another former UTA employee who engaged in 
misconduct that is comparable to the facts before this Court. Robert Clipper was 
terminated by UTA after UTA determined that Mr. Clipper used the "N" word in the 
workplace. (UTA Op. Br. at Exh. C.) There, Mr. Clipper used the "N" word out of the 
presence of an African-American. Following a hearing before an administrative law 
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judge ("ALJ") for the Department, the ALJ found Mr. Clipper culpable within the 
meaning of the Department's just cause test. The ALJ stated that "the claimant violated a 
well-known policy and exposed the employer to potential liability for civil rights 
violations and fostering a hostile work environment". Id. Thus, the Department has 
previously ruled that a single violation of UTA's policy against racial slurs sufficiently 
jeopardizes UTA's rightful interest in avoiding Title VII liability. While that decision is 
not precedential here, it shows that the Department has construed its own Rule to find 
culpability with a claimant who utters a single racial slur in the workplace. 
The Department's decision in the Clipper matter dilutes the Claimant's argument 
that this Court "should not adopt a rule that any employee fired for alleged racial 
harassment . . . is automatically denied benefits because the employer may have an 
unwarranted and exaggerated fear of potential liability, however remote that potential 
might be". (CI. Br. at 19.) Clearly, even the Department acknowledges that a single 
racial slur creates sufficient liability for the employer if the offending employee is 
retained. 
At bottom, an employer is at risk of Title VII liability if it retains an employee 
who uses a racially derogatory remark in the workplace. The only meaningful way to 
protect against that risk is to end the employment relationship. Under the Rule, the 
culpability element is met because there is a risk of Title VII litigation if the employer 
keeps the offending employee in the workplace. The Rule does not require the employer 
to prove that a lawsuit will or may be filed based on the single use of a racial epithet, in 
order to show culpability. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, and for the reasons set forth in UTA's opening brief 
and UTA's Reply Brief in answer to the Board's response, UTA asks this Court to 
reverse the Board's decision granting benefits to the Claimant. 
DATED this / f*9ay of May, 2003. 
Attorney for Petitioner 
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